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Executive Summary:  
 
A convention has persisted for some eight decades now of measuring government outputs in 
national statistics and economic accounts using inputs. This is equivalent to assuming that 
government productivity neither grows nor falls over time. However, modern solutions now 
exist for cost-weighting outputs so as to generate empirically useful metrics of total outputs at 
an organizational level. From this kind of information public sector leaders, managers, and 
stakeholders can learn key lessons about how the productivity path of their agency develops 
over time, and also compares with other agencies in the same policy field - either cross-
nationally for central government bodies, or within the same country for decentralized 
agencies. Solutions also now exist for handling quality issues, and for going beyond individually 
delivered transactional, regulatory or delivery services to also tackle government productivity in 
agencies with complex outcomes.  
 
Improving productivity measurement at the organizational level offers the greatest immediate 
dividends and could successfully cover the largest departments and agencies at national or 
central government level across OECD countries. There is great scope too for looking at other 
large central departments cross-nationally, and for developing organizational-level productivity 
paths for large N decentralized agencies in fields like healthcare, education, policy, transport 
etc. Finally, national statistical agencies have made useful progress in estimating national 
government productivity at sectoral levels. This can contribute to the macro-economic 
understanding of economic growth – although aggregate productivity data may not be helpful 
for improving government sector performance. 
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Introduction: Government productivity in the modern era 
 
Directly delivered government services (and a few goods also) make up a substantial part of the 
GDP of advanced industrial nations. The levels involved vary across OECD countries. But 
something around a fifth to a quarter of final economic output can be safely considered as 
governmentally produced. Yet because of past difficulties in measuring public sector outputs, 
they have primarily been accommodated in national statistics by relying on a conventional 
assumption – that they are the same value as the inputs used in producing them.  
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Productivity can (and should) be thought of in quite simple terms as  
    
   the total value of outputs produced (or sometimes activities undertaken) by an organization  
                         the amount of inputs used in producing them    
                      
The conventional representation of government/public sector outputs by means of inputs of 
course replaces this with just Total inputs/Total inputs. This is equivalent to assuming that the 
productivity of all government sector organizations is always 1, and never changes over time. 
In particular, government productivity growth is inherently zero (Statistics Denmark, 2013, p. 
13). 
 
This mainstream pattern of recording has endured for many decades now, although its 
deficiencies in statistical and economic terms are obvious. Traditionally all or many public 
sector organizations were widely seen as ‘immortal’ or long-lived organizations (Kaufman 
1976), machine bureaucracies delivering administrative and personal services in labour-
intensive and relatively unchanging ways. The conventional wisdom became that measuring 
public sector productivity was ‘an impossible task’ (Boyle, 2007, and see his 2006). In many 
ways very fuzzy concepts like ‘value for money’ (OECD, 2010; OECD, 2015b) distracted 
officials and analysts from productivity measurement. Support for a static view of government 
productivity was also not hard to find. Some decentralized and professionalized public services 
continue to depend largely on in-person interactions between staff and clients (as in most 
healthcare). In many essential healthcare tasks, modern labour requirements may be pretty 
much the same as have always applied (e.g. think of safely lifting a sick person of a certain 
weight into or out of bed). 
 
Yet in the modern, digital era, many other public agencies have greatly changed. For instance, 
regulatory and transaction-handling departments (perhaps especially at national or central 
government level) have becomes a great deal more capital intensive (Dunleavy et al, 2006). In 
little more than 15 years they have changed from labour-intensive organizations to place a 
heavy reliance on IT-based investments, with rapidly shrinking workforces (Dunleavy and 
Carrera, 2013a, Chs 2-6; Dunleavy, 2015). Many IT changes have appeared as ‘disruptive 
innovations’ (Christiansen et al, 2000; Christiansen et al, 2004) for established bureaucracies 
(Margetts and Dunleavy, 2013). The advent of ‘big data’ has great potential for making analytic 
improvements in how services are organized and delivered (Dunleavy, 2016; Margetts, 2013), 
especially in shifting from volumetric patterns of intervention to risk-based management. 
Recent 2016 research undertaken with top officials across all departments in the Australian 
Commonwealth government has shown that digital changes already in process there will affect 
the full range of government regulatory and service-delivery activities, like policing (Perry et al, 
2013; Police UK, 2016). This effect goes far beyond current efforts at the ‘digital 
transformation’ of citizen-facing agencies (Evans et al, 2016) as new technologies like 
distributed ledgers and machine learning may greatly affect previous public sector information 
monopolies (Government Office for Science, 2016; Armstrong, 2015). Across large areas of 
the public services it is now possible to realistically foresee a transition to a ‘robotic state’ 
(Dunleavy and Carrera, 2013b) where a new wave of automation advances are certain to be 
made.  
 
These important variations and contemporary advances now place a premium on actively and 
accurately measuring the productivity of government sector organizations at a range of levels  
– in national statistics, for government as a whole 
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– across large services sectors within a country  involving multiple central and local 
government or public service organizations, such as public healthcare, education or 
law-and-order functions 
– for individual central government departments and agencies 
– for decentralized networks of local provider organizations within the public sector 
and for ‘parastate’ organizations (whether companies or NGOs) working with them 
in the contracted delivery of services on the ground. 
At each of these levels the greatest value of productivity measures lies in 
- creating reliable empirical data on productivity paths, that is, the over-time 
development of  indices of productivity 
- allowing meaningful and insightful comparisons to be made between different 
government organizations or sets of organizations 
so as to allow service controllers and providers to make practical improvements in what is 
being done. 
 
Recent methodological developments pioneered in the Atkinson Report (2005) have been 
implemented in some countries and in a few studies (e.g. Dunleavy and Carrera, 2013a) - see 
next section. It should now be feasible to avoid many past problems of measurement, and to 
exploit the current potential of improved government information systems, so as to move 
decisively away from the conventional assumption of static government productivity. OECD 
countries collectively could now make major improvements both in how government 
productivity is understood within each country, and in developing cross-national comparisons 
and policy-learning.  
 
The challenges here are considerable, as the past history of weak progress in the field over 
decades attests. Yet the gains that could now be made in helping to improve public sector 
efficiency and knowledge of ‘what works’ are also substantial. 
 
 
1.  Five essential steps in measuring productivity in the public  
     sector 
 
The long-run inability to develop widely used measures of government productivity reflects on 
the one hand a considerable failure of imagination and focused effort in economics and public 
management studies, and on the other hand some very sustained resistance by civil servants, 
public sector professionals and some politicians  to the application of ‘crude’ and ‘limited’ 
measures to government activities. Many of these barriers hinge on the issue of ‘quality’ in 
public services, discussed in the next section, and others concern some widespread mis-uses of 
the ‘productivity’ concept, discussed in section 3 below. But here I focus on showing that we 
now know very well how to complete the essential operations involved in computing useful 
productivity indices for government organizations. 
 
    (i) Identify the ‘core’ outputs or activities of the agency 
Like firms, government organizations do myriads of things. But firms’ activities all culminate in 
a clearly defined list of products or services that are sold to customers, so we can clearly 
distinguish as ‘intermediate production’ all the stages that lead up to this marketing of an 
output. By contrast it is not so straightforward for departments and agencies to define which 
few of their outputs or activities are fundamental to or trigger the remainder.  A core output or 
activity is one that gives rise to other activities, which are created as a result of it. For example, 
in a school, teachers running a parent’s evening or marking homework are not core outputs, 
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because they follow on from a more fundamental output or activity – such as, admitting a child 
to the school, or teachers delivering a set of lessons. Similarly, in a taxing agency having staff 
members in call centres answer queries from income tax payers would not be a core activity, 
but counting the number of existing taxpayers and of new taxpayers (because they are more 
costly to handle) would be core. 
 
Core outputs or activities for any agency need to be restricted to complete ‘activity packages’ 
(not parts of operations) or to finally-delivered services (akin to end-products in firms). 
Different core activities should have different origins, rules and practices governing them. For 
example, in a taxation agency each kind of tax will need to be treated as a separate ‘product’; 
and in a welfare agency each type of benefit similarly. Core outputs may also be distinguished 
where parts of the same activity have distinctive cost profiles. For example, in many tax and 
welfare contexts adding new clients is far more costly than just maintaining a service to 
ongoing clients, so it is useful to distinguish these two types of cases separately.   
 
The number of core outputs we distinguish per agency needs to be limited to a few outputs, 
perhaps only one or two for small or single-purpose agencies. For very large agencies with 
diverse activity streams (such as national tax or social security organizations) there might be ten 
or fifteen main outputs, with some of these also showing new clients and existing clients as 
having different cost profiles.  
 
Counting output levels means being clearly able to denominate units or cases. This is easiest in 
transactional agencies (e.g. each taxpayer or recipient of one benefit is a case), and we can treat 
each case as having the same weight. Where organizations deliver more complex outputs this 
may affect both how we distinguish core activities, and require a weighted-count of the levels 
of outputs in each category.  
 
     (ii) Develop unit costs or activity accounting for core outputs 
We next need to attribute administrative costs to each core output or main activity stream that 
an agency operates. This is not necessarily as easy as it sounds, unless the core outputs or 
activities schema has been already in use within the agency. Difficulties commonly arise 
because:  
- Costs are historically monitored only on an inputs basis, and the agency or units 
within it does not know how to attribute costs to different outputs. For instance, a 
fire service might have two core activities, fire prevention and inspection work, and 
emergency response to fires. It might allocate (some of) the same staff to work 
flexibly between the two roles. Partitioning costs across the two core activities may 
not have previously been undertaken 
- Units of outputs or activities have not been previously counted in the same way as 
needed for unit costing. For instance, detailed costs data may be available for a 
wide range of micro-activities that a police force undertakes (such as running a 
crime prevention meeting or briefing neighbourhood watch committees), but these 
costs may have been aggregated up previously only as ‘central’, ‘corporate’ or 
generic activities that were untagged to specific core outputs. 
 
    (iii) Develop a cost-weighted total output metric for each agency 
When we measure total outputs for a given firm, we add up an amount for (sales * price) 
across each of its products. For instance, suppose a firm has two products, the first X priced at 
$5 and selling 20,000 units and the other Y priced at $10 and selling 5,000 units. Its total 
output is thus:  ($5 *20,000) + ($10 * 5,000) = $150,000.  Price is important here in two ways. 
First, it allows us to easily price-weight across completely dissimilar products. Second, in 
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competitive markets with consumer sovereignty, we can make welfare implications about the 
sales patterns observed – in this case that consumers would not freely pay $10 for product Y 
compared with $5 for product X unless they were getting commensurate benefits from it. This 
is very valuable information – so if the firm progressively shifts from X to Y sales, we can infer 
that this is creating a good for (consumers in) society more widely as well as for the firm itself.  
  
In government sector organizations, price-weighting is not feasible (except for a very few 
special cases), because outputs are not marketed, and many outputs must be consumed 
whether citizens or enterprises wish to do so or not. Some outputs are directly coercive, as in 
arresting criminals or enforcing regulations. 
 
The alternative way of getting to total outputs for a government organization was proposed 
and developed by the Atkinson report (2005), namely to weight different outputs by their 
administrative costs. So if a government organization has three core outputs (or activities) F, 
G, and H, its total output can be defined as 
 (units of F *unit costs for F) + (units of G *unit costs for G) +(units of H *unit costs for H) 
 
With total outputs defined in this way we can now begin to make meaningful comparisons of 
how an agency’s outputs compares with other agencies at the same time, which is immediately 
useful in cases where we have large N datasets. However, it is also very helpful to know how 
even a single agency’s total outputs are changing over time, and here direct comparison entails 
adjusting for varying cost levels from year to year. To put the costs in different years onto a 
comparable basis we deflate them to a common, base-year level. We can then compute a total 
outputs index number over time that responds to the changing levels of outputs, and the 
changing mix of outputs, but strips out the otherwise misleading inflation of (and perhaps, in 
future, deflation of) cost levels.  
 
There are a number of technical issues about how to handle costs when generating total 
outputs index numbers (for more details see Robano, 2016; Office for National Statistics, no 
date; Statistics Denmark, 2013).1 Key points include 
- whether to use general costs levels in the economy or for government as a whole as 
the deflator; or 
- whether to use a sector-specific or even agency-specific cost deflator, normally 
because the agency’s costs have a significantly different dynamic from those in the 
economy or government as a whole – as may be true for say defence equipment, or 
for health-care costs; and 
- how to link across years in computing the index numbers, using more sophisticated 
‘chaining’ methods that allow for mid-year or more continuous shifts in costs 
levels, as opposed to unsmoothed changes of cost levels from one year or period to 
the next. 
One main argument for using general GDP deflators across multiple sectors and agencies, or 
alternatively whole-of-government cost deflators, is that it facilitates easier comparison 
between different parts of the public sector in the same country. In comparing productivity 
levels across countries, using more general costs deflators may also have advantages. 
 
    (iv) Develop an accurate total inputs cost number for the agency  
Most government organizations in OECD countries have well-developed information on most 
of their input costs for a given year’s outputs or activities. The total salary bill will normally be 
very well known, plus the costs of intermediate products supplied by contractors (e.g. private 
call centres), and the agency’s annual running costs on property, equipment maintenance, 
materials, routine small procurements and so on. 
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However, difficulties often arise in respect of  
- measuring accurately the total capital costs for buildings or major equipments, like 
IT systems, or in defence the acquisition of complex equipments likes planes or 
weapons systems;  
- attributing these costs across the multiple years that the capital investment is being 
used; and 
- costing in depreciation, usage and wear and tear.  
Buildings, IT systems, equipments and other resources may also be planned to be used for one 
period of years, but then either remain in use for longer than planned (e.g. because output 
mixes have been adjusted to allow this) or are deployed for less time than planned (e.g. because 
equipment, IT or buildings prove inappropriate for the evolving patterns of service delivery). 
 
In addition, governments often confront difficulties in costing accurately apparently ‘free’ 
resources that are inherited from earlier periods without charge, or have been requisitioned in 
non-market ways, or both. For example, an army might own large tracts of land as military 
training grounds that have been in their current use for many years and perhaps were acquired 
at non-market prices initially. Generally the measurement of ‘public sector equity’ remains a 
highly problematic field. Both in their own internal accounting and in national statistics many 
governments continue to use conventional solutions for valuing public sector equity that are 
palpably inadequate – for instance, valuing a land registry simply as the costs of the IT capital 
equipment used to store the database. 
 
Exactly as with total outputs, there are a number of technical alternatives in computing index 
numbers for total inputs, again including using general economic deflators for costs, or sector-
specific costs, and how to ‘chain’ or link costs levels across years or periods (see Robano, 2016; 
Office for National Statistics, no date; Statistics Denmark, 2013)). 
 
     (v) Divide total outputs by total inputs to give a total factor productivity  
           number for the organization 
In the modern era, by far the most useful productivity measure in any given year or period is 
total factor productivity (TFP) 
 TFP =   cost-weighted total outputs 
                            inclusive total inputs cost 
The key advantages of the TFP measure are: 
- it includes both directly-produced outputs from the agency’s own staff, and 
intermediate outputs supplied by other government agencies, or ‘para-state’ firms,  
or NGOs under contract; so 
- changes in the balance of internal production and contracting-out do not affect the 
comparability of the TFP numbers before and after the change. 
 
Where capital costs cannot be accurately determined, both the cost-weighting of outputs and 
the estimate of total input costs are impaired. However, it is still most helpful in such 
conditions to compute: 
 ‘near TFP’ =  cost-weighted total outputs (lacking capital costs) 
                                        total inputs cost (lacking capital costs) 
 
In conditions where an agency produces all its outputs internally, and uses only minor or 
routine amounts of contracted or intermediate outputs services, it may be useful to compute 
 labour productivity =   cost-weighted total outputs 
                                                 inclusive labour inputs cost 
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Labour productivity might also be a useful sub-measure of total productivity to calculate in 
particular circumstances, where analysis focuses below the core outputs level and below an 
agency’s total outputs and costs. For instance, in defence equipment planning it is useful to 
know how an older naval ship with a large crew compares in running costs per day at sea with 
a newer ship with more automated capital equipment and a smaller crew. 
 
Bear in mind, however, that changes in an agency’s labour productivity measure over time will 
be acutely sensitive to any alterations of the scope of external contracting or commissioning in 
producing outputs. Over-time series will not be comparable across such changes, and 
comparisons between agencies using different levels of commissioning and outsourcing will 
not be feasible. 
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    (vi)  Decide on a strategy for controlling quality issues 
In public services it is important develop an approach to incorporating quality in one of two 
ways. A first approach treats quality as stable over time unless and until there is clear evidence 
of a decline or quality lapse, which may affect only one or two years in a quality path. A second 
approach reweights all the ‘total cost-weighted output’ numbers derived in section (v) above 
for variable quality levels across years. These options are discussed in detail in section 2 next. 
 
2. Is measuring services quality needed for government  
    productivity metrics? Two main approaches 
 
One reason why the pubic sector employs far more graduates and highly educated staff than 
many private firms is that the delivery of government services on the ground is 
professionalized and often involves very personal issues and needs. We do not have a ‘big 
book’ manual or a giant expert system that can tell us how to treat people who show up in an 
emergency room with symptoms that might suggest a heart attack. Instead we invest resources 
in establishing an ER operation, employing qualified and (hopefully) dedicated professional 
staffs who are empowered to treat every case in a ‘best practice’ way.  
 
The Economist famously defined a service as ‘any product sold in trade that cannot be dropped 
on your foot’. So services are already far less tangible, far more relational and far ‘fuzzier’ in 
character than goods. Public services often add extra, highly salient dimensions of urgency (e.g. 
ambulance arrival times), strong need (e.g. acute healthcare), sensitivity (e.g. mental health 
treatment), compulsion (e.g. disease or HIV notification), recognition of rights (e.g. 
immigration appeals), equality of treatment (e.g. fairness across taxpayers) and an appropriate 
service relationship (in the absence of a payments nexus between consumer and service 
supplier).  All these factors mean that how public services are delivered and when they are 
received are highly salient issues. An influential line of argument in public management for two 
decades has argued that the essential task of administrators is exceptionally complex because 
their key mission is to maximize the ‘public value’ of services, which can be shaped by many 
different factors (Moore, 1997). 
 
Yet it is important not to exaggerate the differences between public and private sector 
organizations. Services quality is also a key issue across many professionalized private sector 
services. And not all public sector services are fully professionalized – some indeed are 
delivered by massive bureaucracies in highly systematized ways. Accordingly quality issues may 
be handled in two ways: 
 
(a) Treat services’ core outputs as being of uniform quality over time or across 
agencies, unless strong evidence suggests quality lapses or variations 
Where service delivery is highly bureaucratized, as in taxation, social security and most 
regulatory functions (e.g. passports issuing, immigration control or vehicle licensing) there are 
good grounds for believing that service quality is fairly uniform in the normal course of 
operations. The activities implied by any core output type are constant – for instance, when 
citizens deal with a tax agency they can find information about what to do by looking at its 
website or by ringing up a call centre with an enquiry. Perhaps not all calls to tax contact 
centres get through (especially close to deadline submission dates), but the percentage of 
successful calls expected and delivered as part of the service remains fairly constant from year 
to year.  
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However, if the usual fail rate for phone calls connecting is (say) 15%, but in one year that 
suddenly jumps to 44% (as has happened to the UK’s HMRC department on two occasions in 
the last decade) then in the exceptional year this is clear evidence of a serious quality slump. 
When this happens we must inevitably conditionalize the total factor productivity number 
recorded for that year. (For example, in the tax case, perhaps staff in the call centre service 
were cut back too much, reducing total input costs but also changing the character of the 
service. Clearly an income tax system operating with and without a generally accessible phone 
enquiry service are non-comparable outputs). Note that we do not have any measure of quality 
and so cannot replace the index number for the problematic year. The relevant data point stays 
in the time series or in the comparative data set, but we pay special attention to it, lest any 
changes it reflects are simply the effects of the quality lapse. 
 
This approach is useful in a second simplifying way. Suppose that an income tax agency has 
introduced online tax forms to replace previous paper forms. Should we count this as a quality 
improvement? The approach to identifying core outputs and activities above shows that this is 
not needed. Tax agencies generally transition to using online forms only when the society as a 
whole is making an equivalent set of transitions to digital ways of working. We do not need to 
separately identify a ‘quality’ improvement by the tax agency – its online provision just means 
that it is operating a modern tax system (and not an anachronistic one, out of touch with 
societal norms and expectations). In other words it is using an appropriate ‘tool of 
government’ for its time and environment (Hood and Margetts, 2007). In this case, as the 
transition from paper to online tax forms rolls out, we would expect to see savings in total 
inputs accruing, and hence TFP improving.  
 
Similarly, if a social security agency modernizes its websites or offices for the public so as to 
more closely approximate those found in the private sector, then even though the change may 
be a costly one, we should still treat service quality as unchanged. No separate provision is 
needed for registering a service quality improvement where a change in a government service 
simply keeps pace with point of service standards elsewhere in the economy. 
 
 
(b) Apply an additional quality-weighting to the ‘total outputs weighted by unit 
costs’ metric 
Across most professionalized services, especially those delivered personally to clients and run 
by decentralized local or sometimes regional agencies, quality variations may be more 
important in judging all service outputs. And output numbers that are not quality-adjusted or 
standardized may especially create the capacity for misleading productivity signals. Suppose 
hospital J admits and treats patients with a given condition over four days on average, taking 
time to check their recovery before sending them home. Meanwhile hospital K admits patients 
and treats them more speedily, sending them home after two days, but with a high proportion 
of patients encountering problems from inadequate care and later needing another admission 
to rectify things that have gone awry. If readmissions are separately counted it is perfectly 
feasible that conscientious hospital J has worse output or activity data than the skimping 
hospital K. 
 
Bad policies may also create an apparent ‘need’ for more of the most expensive services. For 
instance, fire service M has invested heavily in fire prevention, and in consequence has fewer 
fires and less demand for its emergency fire outputs. Meanwhile, another fire service N does 
little preventative work, has more local fires, so creating more ‘demand’ for its costly 
emergency teams.  
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Measuring service quality was previously very hard to do, since this is an intangible variable, 
which may seem to require close and labour-intensive investigation before it can be established 
in a single case, let alone assessed across many different decentralized services. However, in the 
modern era a number of developments have made available regular flows of information that 
have a bearing upon service quality, including: 
- Complaints about services are a useful metric, Many OECD countries now require 
that all complaints about public services are systematically recorded in publicly 
available ways, and the range of complaints has expanded. (See Dunleavy et al 
(2010) for the UK case). 
 
- Response times in dealing with complaints are also good indicators of the quality of 
agencies’ provision. 
 
- Official ‘star ratings’ of services and report are often now provided by central 
government regulators who oversee decentralized agencies and outsourced service 
providers in areas like social care, health care and education. Ratings may not be 
updated every year, however, although most are regularly revisited. 
 
- Similarly it might be feasible to operationalize indicators of quality for a wide range 
of other outputs – for instance, the conditions of roads in terms of numbers of 
potholes or graded assessments, or the condition of pavements in terms of 
compensation payments made for pedestrian trips and falls. 
 
- Surveys of users’ experiences may provide additional useful indicators of clients’ 
experiences and level of satisfaction with services. Key difficulties here are that 
most people’s views tend to be general recollections or judgements, which may be 
vague, subject to recall defects, or coloured by respondents’ overall views of 
government and politics. 
 
- Some governments make an effort to systematically attract targeted online feedback 
from service users on the quality of their immediate experiences – for instance, the 
UK’s NHS Choices website includes large numbers of patients’ comments in ‘Trip 
Advisor’ mode, some praising the care they received and others criticizing the care 
given or facilities. These valuable ‘real time’ indicators can be linked to 
 
- ‘Sentiment analysis’ amongst local populations about their local services which 
might be tapped using Automatic Processing Interfaces (APIs) provided by some 
companies like Facebook, Twitter or other forums. Paying attention to press or 
media criticisms may also be useful in assessing quality across very large or national 
providers, and can often serve as a leading indicator of upcoming crises. But 
normally for local agencies the incidence of public criticism will be too small to 
permit detection or analysis. Finally 
 
- Internal agency surveys of staff opinion and morale offer important insights into 
the likely service quality being achieved by providers. Many public services and 
NGOs attract ‘mission committed’ staff, whose commitment to doing a decent and 
professional job (often for relatively low pay) is a key source of quality (Besley and 
Ghatak, 2005). If staff are disillusioned with how their agency is operating, they 
may be some of those in the best positions to detect poor service quality. For 
instance, in a social work agency where staff survey responses show that they are 
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demoralized and distrust their leadership and managers, it will be difficult for good 
caring and protection work to get done (Munroe, 2011).  
 
In most service contexts within most individual OECD countries, it should be practical to 
operationalize some quality weightings for core outputs or activities based on a basket of some 
of these or similar indicators. However, it is likely to be far more difficult to secure any 
international agreement on relevant quality weights. None the less, quite apart from their use in 
productivity calculations, having good indicators of real time public service quality can be very 
helpful for national, regional and local political leaders and top officials – in providing lead 
indicators of upcoming problems that could develop later on into major issues or even policy 
crises. 
 
Once a quality weight metric has been agreed, it is a relatively simple matter to apply the 
weighting to the cost-weighted total outputs metrics recommended above (in section 1, point 
(iv)).  Adding an appropriate quality weight will increase the total outputs of high quality 
service providers and reduce the total outputs of poor quality providers (Dunleavy and Carrera, 
2013a, Ch.7). The salience of the quality weights to be applied will need to be carefully judged 
in each service area. The end result should be a quality-adjusted as well as cost-weighted total 
outputs index that can be applied to large N settings, where multiple service providers are 
delivering services to citizens, such as local authorities or local hospitals or healthcare 
providers. 
 
 
3. Measuring productivity in national/ central government  
           departments and agencies 
 
Across OECD governments there are some common patterns in the structure of ministerial or 
cabinet-level departments. Most countries have around 14 or 15 major national departments, 
covering broadly analogous fields like taxation, social security, defence, interior, justice and 
prisons, homeland security and immigration, foreign affairs, overseas development, 
environment, local government/housing/planning, education, and health and social care. The 
mission briefs of departments in different countries varies somewhat, but especially within 
Europe and the EU there is a substantial measure of administrative convergence. And cabinets 
also include 5 to 8 other ministers heading up smaller or more technical (such as legal) 
departments. The invaluable OECD data collation series, Government at a Glance (OECD, 
2015a) already documents some substantial continuities (but also some important differences) 
in how liberal democratic governments operate. And there are a few other valuable 
comparative treatments (e.g. Goderis, 2015). Yet there are at present no comparative 
productivity data covering even some (let alone all) major departments at central level in 
OECD countries. 
 
This huge gap in our knowledge is far more important than it may seem as first sight. Each 
national government typically contains only one example of any given type of department – 
e.g. one taxing agency, one social security administration, one defence ministry and armed 
forces. Within that country there are no other agencies doing substantially the same function 
with which comparisons can be made, nor lessons drawn. Each central department in an 
OECD country can justifiably claim to be unique in some sense, the sole representative of 
department type X within its national government. Departments with the same broad mission 
in other countries may be situated in completely different political and policy environments 
from X, and will often operate at quite different scales. Differences in experiences and 
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trajectories are hard to usefully compare when so many potentially conflating variations must 
be taken into account. 
 
Yet, despite this there are some departments for which productivity paths over time can be 
more easily calculated – and comparisons between productivity paths can much more fruitfully 
be drawn. I consider these in sub-section (a) below. In sub-section (b) I look at the somewhat 
more intractable problems arising with large agencies delivering complex collective outputs. 
Lastly section (c) discusses tracking the performance of smaller policy and regulatory 
departments with ‘intangible’ outputs.  
  
(a) Citizen-facing ministries/ agencies with large transactional loads  
Typically the biggest departments within any national government in terms of staff levels and 
running costs will be concentrated in some traditional core state functions that are heavily 
transactional, involving the agencies in millions of interactions with citizens, enterprises and 
other individual organizations in civil society. This transaction-heavy category also includes 
many service delivery activities and covers: 
-  Paying social security benefits, in the UK accounting for a quarter of civil servants 
for instance. 
-  Raising taxation, increasingly dominated by income taxes and social security 
contributions and by VAT/GST general consumer taxes. Again, in the UK this has 
historically accounted for a quarter of civil servants, although this proportion is 
falling.  
-   Supervising and running most law and order functions, plus part-running homeland 
security, and border force/ immigration functions 
-   Supervising the law courts, directly administering (national) prisons, other justice 
functions. 
There may also be a few other central government regulatory agencies running discrete 
functions that require substantial transactions with citizens and enterprises, such as registering 
land and property, and administering passports or vehicle and driver registration, although in 
some OECD countries these functions are handled at sub-national level.  
 
The huge advantage that these organizations have is in identifying core outputs – e.g. each type 
of tax, or benefit, or prison – and in having straightforward unit counting to scale these 
different activities. Although small sections of these organizations do handle complex high-
order projects, the vast bulk of outputs are denominated by individual cases, which makes 
scaling demand and supply far easier. 
 
Here the focus is on whether or not each department or agency shows a pattern of 
improvements in productivity (total outputs/ total inputs) across relatively long periods, at 
least five years, and ideally looking across a decade. We should not expect to see a pattern of 
continuous year-on-year improvements for several reasons. Like firms, departments may show 
heightened productivity levels in periods of sharply rising demand, as more clients are 
processed (for a short while) by pre-existing staff levels and installed systems are worked more 
heavily.  Similarly, department’s productivity levels may decline if the demand for outputs falls 
off unexpectedly, before staffing levels or facilities can be adjusted downwards. But over a five 
to ten year period these wobbles should wash out and it should be feasible to see if 
departments are improving productivity or not.  
 
For example, Figures 1 to 3 show some contrasting patterns from a recent study of 
productivity paths in UK central government, where the approach of assuming pretty 
standardized service quality over time was adopted (Dunleavy and Carrera, 2013a, Chs 3-6): 
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–    The function of controlling import and exports regulation is shown in Figure 1 for 
the UK. The chart shows dramatic improvements in productivity across a decade, 
reflecting an early and large investment in new IT and in risk-based management 
approaches.  
–    The UK’s main tax agency shows a lagged improvement at the end of a decade 
following a major reorganization and the maturing of online services after a 
previous rather static period (Figure 2). And  
–    The social security function in the UK shows twenty years of non-progress in 
improving productivity (Figure 3). This pattern reflected the absence of any 
modernizing investments in the 1990s, and then a major merger and reorganization 
and heavy investment in new services during the early 2000s. The latter changes at 
first severely depressed organizational productivity levels, but later years’ numbers 
did show some promise of the modernization making sustainable if lagged savings. 
 
 Figure 1. Total factor productivity in the UK Customs regulation on trade, 1997-2008 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Dunleavy and Carrera, 2013a, p. 70. 
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Figure 2. Labour and intermediate inputs productivity, UK taxation, 1997 to 2008, using 
tax collection activity data 
 
 
Source:  Dunleavy and Carrera, 2013a, p. 106. 
 
Figure 3. Longer-term estimates of changes in total factor productivity 
for UK ‘social protection’ services, from 1987 to 2008 
 
 
 
Source:  Dunleavy and Carrera, 2013a, p. 149. 
Notes: Authors’ calculations based on data from National Statistics and DWP/DSS 
departmental reports. 
 
 
Dunleavy and Carrera (2013a; 2011) explain how these three productivity paths were 
established. They look in detail at some of the key influences shaping them, of which IT and 
digital investment changes were dominant, along with administrative reorganizations and 
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investments in new buildings and reorganized work processes. This source also shows how the 
productivity pathways approach was also applied to another three, smaller regulatory agencies 
with heavy transactional loads. 
 
For the leaders and managers of all these large central agencies over-time comparisons are 
important sources of information. Given relatively stable organizational functions, and 
structures that evolve but normally bear close family resemblances to each other over 
successive years, tracing and explaining the productivity path for one’s own department 
provides  key information that cannot be gained from any other source. Of course, 
productivity paths do not say anything about whether organizations are focusing successfully 
on the right outcomes, or about a department’s overall effectiveness in delivering on government 
objectives. But they do speak to the technical efficacy of the organization in converting inputs 
into outputs and activities, and they do so in an unblinking, objective manner that cannot be 
swayed by the ‘hype’ that often surrounds ministerial or civil service self-presentation of their 
activities. 
 
Major departments have close analogues in other national executives. So comparing productivity 
paths for the same functional department across countries can generate very potent additional 
learning for public management. The US Social Security Administration, the British 
Department of Work and Pensions and Swedish Försäkringskassan (National Agency for 
Social Insurance) operate on radically different population scales (and somewhat different 
spatial scales). But given commonalities of IT and technologies, similarities in functions, and 
relatively similar liberal democratic political contexts, we might none the less expect to see 
broadly analogous changes in their productivity paths over time. If instead we find that some 
social security or taxing agencies have static or declining productivity paths, while others are 
growing productivity appreciably, questions should clearly arise about the variations. 
 
    (b) Large central departments delivering complex outputs 
A second category of large central agencies directly produce substantial collective and non-
marketed services including especially:  
-     Organizing national defence, and administering the armed forces. National defence 
ministries are smaller bodies now, while armed forces are far smaller than in the 
past but remain substantial organizations in staff numbers 
-     Foreign affairs, and overseas trade 
-     Intelligence activities bearing on homeland or national security – especially agencies 
for internal security, overseas spying and electronic surveillance, whose staffing has 
considerably expanded in most countries (e.g. see Brill, 2016) 
 
For all these agencies enumerating units or cases may seem to be possible only at the most 
basic level, but not for the kinds of output that ‘really matter’. For instance, we can record new 
cases started by a police force or an intelligence agency, but some may be routine and less 
salient, whereas others can develop into very large-scale and top-salience operations. In order 
to make productivity path comparisons over time, taking advantage of the generally stable 
functional responsibilities in these core areas, the organizations involved will have to be able to 
rank their outputs into categories, ideally in ways that do not use inputs data (like personnel 
costs) to denote salience (which reintroduces circularity into productivity measurement).  
 
Some half-way steps towards measuring productivity can normally draw on and inform analytic 
work that is already ongoing, by focusing on scaling the most fundamental end-activities and 
attributing costs to them. For instance, for an air force the key metric might be the number of 
hours that aircraft operated, or were available fit to operate, or operated on active service in the 
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field perhaps overseas. For a police force, the core activities might be a salience-weighted case 
mix. Getting organizations to make more explicit the ways in which they rank or grade 
different cases or levels of complex services being delivered is difficult. But by definition all 
these organizations are already using some implicit (‘judgemental’) way of doing this. The key 
trick is to bring out these categories in ways independent of the allocation of inputs. 
 
We do not yet have any worked-up examples of productivity path analyses for national (or top-
level) police forces, defence ministries, the armed forces, or foreign affairs or intelligence 
departments. A lot of work would need to be done on specifying core outputs and prototyping 
productivity measures in each case. Some observers have argued for the regular use of 
particular metrics – e.g. the National Commission of Audit (2014 in Australia) argued that: ‘A 
simpler and leaner structure is a priority … [So] a particular focus should be the ratio of the 
combat force to other personnel (the so called ‘teeth to tail’ ratio, TTR). Defence should 
develop a programme to improve this over time’ (p. 131). However, evidence from the USA 
over a long period shows that with mechanization and automation, in fact the TTR number 
has been falling (as it should do). In addition, the ratio also falls during extended periods of 
operations as an effective supply chain grows to support deployed forces. A recent Australia 
review recommended discontinuing its use of TTR (Defence Department, Australia, 2015, p. 
64). The ratio is also vulnerable to shifts when levels of outsourcing change, as are all labour 
productivity numbers excluding labour in suppliers of intermediate outputs.  
 
So perhaps attention should focus instead on more disaggregated productivity path analyses - 
e.g. measuring the labour productivity of sailors on naval ships to see if capital intensification is 
yielding the over-time gains that it should be. Some progress might also be made with activity 
data that relates to outputs, such as the numbers of ‘flying hours’ achieved by pilots in different 
services recorded (for the last year only) in Australia’s Defence Portfolio budget documents 
(Defence Department, 2016, Tables 18, 20 and 22). A somewhat similar measure is Unit 
Availability Days (UADs), defined as ‘a day when a unit is materielly ready and its personnel 
state and level of competence enables the unit to safely perform tasks in the unit’s normal 
operating environment, immediately’ (Defence Department, 2016, Tables 16). Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) methods (explained on the next page) might also be usefully 
applied to the operational units of the armed forces (Hanson, 2016). Productivity path analyses 
using actual achieved readiness or operational metrics over time could be insightful. In 
principle the techniques applied in Figures 1 to 3 should also be fully applicable to large central 
delivery agencies when appropriately worked up, and when used in combination with perhaps 
larger baskets of indices that can take account of the greater complexity of outputs.  
 
Service quality factors may also be less standardized than in the 3(a) category organizations 
above. However, it should be feasible to construct a basket of measures that can be used for 
quality checking (against major lapses in quality), or even to do quality weighting of more 
disaggregated outputs. Looking at stakeholder ratings, internal staff morale, ‘sentiment analysis’ 
of press and social media for ‘close to the department’ groups, and perhaps expert and audit 
office assessments can all be helpful here. 
  
(c) Smaller central government organizations, especially policy-making or 
regulatory ones 
Most national governments include ‘control agencies’ (Dunleavy, 1991, Ch. 7) whose main 
business is to do national policy-making and to channel funding via grants to regional or local 
governments who actually do all the delivery. Control agencies are typically small organizations 
(spending perhaps 2% of the total budget they supervise on their own operations). Good 
examples are education ministries in Anglo-American democracies, transport ministries, and 
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often departments supervising healthcare or environmental planning systems. Other relatively 
small ministries provide Treasury/Ministry of Finance budgeting, legal services or other 
corporate services, and their ‘customers’ are only other departments. 
 
The core problem here may be to get to any meaningful activity counts that are not just inputs-
based. But some things are countable - like responding to consultation memos sent around by 
other departments, handling other correspondence and questions from the legislature, the 
numbers of ministerial or public events undertaken, and the numbers of routine checks or 
authorizations carried out. The aim here is to get to some kind of ‘base load’ measures for the 
department’s work, to which might be added more complex or less regular activities such as 
piloting new legislation through Parliament or Congress, consulting with stakeholders on new 
legislation, or undertaking unusually intensive activities (such as an austerity spending round in 
a finance ministry). To estimate final ‘loads’ on departments, it is also useful to look at how a 
department’s ‘customers’ elsewhere in central government rated its services, plus stakeholder 
ratings, internal staff morale, ‘sentiment analysis’ of press and social media for ‘close to the 
department’ groups, and perhaps expert and audit office assessments. These may help fix both 
levels of outputs delivered and give clues to service quality levels.  
 
 
4.   Measuring productivity in decentralized public  
      sector organizations 
 
Most regionally or locally delivered services require contact with or delivery to clients in 
person, especially professional services (as with most welfare state services provision), or 
carrying out operations on the ground (as with building flood defences or repairing roads). 
Some of these areas may raise in an acute form the issues of measuring service quality 
discussed above in section 2. As a result the general level of development of productivity 
measures here is less advanced than for the central agencies discussed in section 3a above. In 
addition, activity accounting may not be so well developed as a universal practice in smaller 
regional or local departments and agencies as it is in a few OECD central governments  
 
However, assessing productivity for regional and local agencies, and for contracted service 
providers, has one key advantage. With a large number of relatively comparable service 
providers like local governments or outsourced contractors we can compare productivity levels 
amongst them. We can also often link performance with explanatory data, and so use multi-
variate analysis to statistically assess ‘what works’ and why. Such analysis can then generate 
information for service-providers on how they compare with other agencies, and can provide 
valuable guidance for policy-makers in seeking to improve productivity.  
 
The two main approaches are:  
- Regression analysis, where the aim is to fit an overall regression line to a whole data 
set, identifying ‘under-performers’ as those below the line (see Figure 4). 
Regression analyses make it easier to use quality-weighting of outputs, and some 
examples show that taking account of quality at the whole-organization level can be 
operationalized (Dunleavy and Carerra, 2013a, Chs 7-8); and  
 
- Data envelopment analysis (DEA) where the aim is identify ‘under-performers’ as 
those on the interior of the DEA ‘production frontier’. These are units that have a 
capacity to move towards the frontier while keeping the same service mix (see 
Figure 5). 
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Figure 4.   Regression analysis of decentralized agencies’ data  
                  (in this hypothetical example, the dependent variable is ‘police personnel   
       per 10,000 crimes’ and the explanatory variable is % local unemployment) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Dunleavy and Carrera, 2013a, p. 206. 
 
 
Figure 5. A data envelopment analysis of decentralized agencies productivity 
(In this hypothetical example, local fire services are compared for two core activities,  
emergency responses and fire prevention work. The production frontier is defined by      
the lowest cost local services closest to the origin. The rays from the origin show   
selected comparisons of fire services with the same outputs mix). 
 
 
Source:  Dunleavy and Carrera, 2013a, p. 212. 
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We do not yet have any examples of large N studies focusing on productivity paths over time 
for whole organizations. But the insights here would be even greater, since the number of data 
points increases, and over-time regression analysis can use ‘fixed effects’ to separate out the 
effects of factors distinctive to individual agencies from more generally operating explanatory 
variables. 
 
There have been some studies by economists of influences on organizational performance 
across local authorities. But even in sophisticated cases they fall well short of operationalizing 
productivity effectively as total outputs/total inputs.  Some accounts are suggestive of the 
wider potential – for instance, analyses of the influence of management practices on 
performance in UK hospitals and schools (Bloom et al, 2011 and 2014). However, such studies 
are few. ‘[I]n economics it is not common to specify management as an input at all’ (Førsund, 
2013, p. 18). 
 
This picture may seem surprising because there is a great deal of activity and performance data 
being used administratively to monitor micro-changes in education, healthcare and social care 
policies. However, some of this information is very disaggregated. For instance, much medical 
research has focused on individual treatments or types of disease-handling, and some over-
time trajectories here are well established. The challenge is to relate such disaggregated data 
work to performance at the whole-organization level within the public sector, so as to try and 
capture overall productivity lessons. For instance, we may know on a specialism-by-specialism 
basis how public hospitals compare with each other (and possibly non-public hospitals also) on 
pregnancy care, handling heart attacks, providing cancer care, and other services. We may even 
have time series data on this. But we may still not know how whole hospitals (with varying case 
mixes and functions) compare in overall productivity. For doctors and medical researchers this 
has not been such a salient research issue previously.  
 
But for public hospital managers it is vital to try to find out the importance for productivity of 
such factors as equipment spending, development of IT and digital capabilities, financial 
management to avoid closures or admissions crises, different HR approaches, and good 
general management and leadership – all of which can only be assessed at the whole-hospital 
level (see Dunleavy and Carrera, 2013a, Chs 7 and 8 for one early effort). 
 
 
5. Improving productivity measures for government as a 
whole and for large public service sectors in national 
statistics 
 
In an ideal world perhaps the most accurate way to arrive at productivity numbers for a whole 
public services sector (like education in schools) would be to aggregate up from the 
component delivery organizations to the whole-sector level. We are a long way from being able 
to do this at present. However, some OECD countries have made extended efforts to 
compute productivity numbers for the whole of government directly, or for large sectors of 
public services. They seek to replace the conventional inputs measure of government sector 
outputs in national statistics with more empirically based alternatives.  
 
To do this national statistical agencies (NSAs) must use independently gathered output or 
activity data, focusing on variables like the number of lesson hours taught in the schools 
sector. The Atkinson report (2005) methodology can be used to aggregate up outputs of 
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different types so as to reach a total output number, and total inputs numbers are normally 
already calculable.  
 
However, the scarcity of such data has meant that many NSAs have actually compiled output 
measures which draw extensively on some input measures, together with some output or 
activity measures, and also elements of outcomes achieved. This approach risks a certain 
amount of circularity (since inputs contribute both to the numerator and denominator in 
computing productivity). But NSAs argue that they help to yield robustly-grounded output 
numbers, and thus add to the understanding of macro-economic performance and growth over 
time.   
 
A minority of NSAs have also sought to add in outcomes data as a component of outputs 
measures, and others have attempted to quality weight outputs using outcome measures. These 
efforts have the merits of tackling the quality conundrum addressed in section 2 above, and 
can perhaps increase the accuracy of output recording at this aggregated level. However, either 
approach may have some drawbacks or dangers. Attention may shift away from outputs data 
(such as lesson hours delivered, which are relatively easy to reach consensus about) to 
outcomes data (such as qualifications attained by school students in public exams at 16 or 18). 
But outcomes are not what productivity is about (see Gonand et al, 2007; OECD, 2009; 
Schreyer, 201; Schreyer 2012). Such a shift is understandable. But it risks turning a limited 
metric of one aspect of performance into being some kind of omnibus measure of all aspects of 
performance – on which it is likely to be far harder to reach consensus. For instance, in the 
UK Labour governments from 1997 to 2010 assigned a high salience to school leaver’s exam 
performances, claiming that rising pass rates showed a quality increase in education 
performance. However, many critics argued that the apparent increases were due to grade 
inflation, and from 2010 a Conservative-Liberal Democrat government took steps to ‘restore 
confidence’ in school exam grades.  
 
It might be objected that more objective data, like standardized morbidity rates for hospitals or 
survival time for key diseases can be helpful here. But many ‘quality’ indicators taken to be vital 
at an aggregate or national scale can be subject to ‘gaming’, as with indicators like UK waiting 
times in hospital emergency rooms (where hospitals established separate ‘rooms’ to move very 
delayed cases too, perhaps separated from the official ER by no more than a curtain). The 
fewer the indicators used for sector ‘quality’ measures the more likely they may be to be subject 
to agency manipulation. Goodhart’s law probably applies, that ‘any regulatory indicator 
selected to be critical for policy automatically loses meaning’. At the statistical level ‘diagnosis-
related groups’ might seem to give a disaggregated grip on hospital outputs, since they 
originally covered 460+ categories, and progress in their use has been made, especially in the 
USA. However, during efforts to operationalize ‘quasi-markets’ in health care in the UK and 
Italy, even more detailed classifications of treatments were deployed – but there was still often 
scope for agencies to categorize cases in ways that either maximized their revenues or 
improved their apparent performance (Bevan and Hood, 2006).  
 
The great advantages of statistical efforts to measure overall government productivity at 
national level, or at the level of large component public services or policy sectors, are twofold. 
First, they hold out the promise of improving national economic statistics, especially over the 
long term, as expertise in this still-fledgling field deepens. Second, they are also useful for 
making cross-national comparisons, so that governments and their top administrators can try 
to benchmark their country’s performance against those of ‘need neighbour’ countries. 
Especially if a run of five to ten years’ statistics can be compiled for several countries, comparing 
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productivity paths becomes feasible, and this is far more useful than isolated observations of the 
kind sometimes generated by academic research studies.   
 
There are some key limitations of measuring government productivity at national level:  
-     Only very aggregate numbers are generated, and they may tend to be far more static 
over time than single agency numbers, because national numbers include many 
countervailing trends. For instance, over time the alleged ‘Baumol effect’ (Baumol, 
1967) may tend to pull more resources into the most labour intensive parts of the 
public sector like health care (Baumol et al, 2013) – although this effect is disputed 
(Bailey et al, 2016). So slower productivity gains here can easily offset and mask 
faster gains being made elsewhere (for instance, especially in IT-heavy public 
services). Even within major sectors, advances in some aspects of service delivery 
are likely to be offset by crises or under-provision elsewhere, perhaps exaggerated 
by zig-zag policy paths (or even pointless ‘policy churn’) enforced by changes of 
the partisan control of government. Highly aggregated numbers are also resistant to 
analysis, offering few useful clues about why productivity trends are as they are. 
 
-     Management approaches and issues may well affect health or education outputs. For 
instance, suppose a hospital runs out of money before the end of the financial year, 
so that it has to cancel many elective surgeries. Here its overall productivity may fall 
for reasons that have nothing to do with doctors’ or nurses’ productivity or 
effectiveness. They are primed to do more work, but budget limits mean that they 
cannot do so. Similarly, running very old IT and implementing austerity 
programmes may hold back a wide range of health providers, saving money but 
worsening productivity at the same time by slowing modernization processes. In 
education a substantial literature also now suggests that the overall leadership of 
school principals, or the internal governance culture of schools (or both), can help 
shape students’ attainments and teachers’ effectiveness (Bloom et al, 2014). These 
kinds of whole-organization influences cannot normally be accessed by data at 
sectoral or national levels, 
 
-     National or sectoral numbers are so widescale that they are typically not ‘owned’ by 
anyone. If progress is slow or non-existent in a whole policy sector, involving a 
central department and multiple decentralized local providers or municipal 
agencies, the national department may exhort providers to greater efforts. And the 
municipalities or other providers may complain of being starved of modernization 
funding. Good providers may know that the national statistics do not apply to 
them, while bad providers will know that their performance is camouflaged and not 
identifiable by their stakeholders or supervising national departments. In other 
words, unlike the measures discussed in sections 3 and 4 above, national or sectoral 
data may have very limited practical value (perhaps even no value) in giving public 
managers meaningful data that they can use to achieve improvements.  
     
-     Standardizing productivity data comparably across countries is likely to be hard and to take a 
long time. Of course, NSAs are highly skilled and expert in making progress across 
many different fields with similar difficulties. But the poor historical record of work 
in the productivity area suggests that achieving broad statistical progress on 
comparable lines will be difficult. In addition, there is always a lot of resistance to 
measuring productivity crudely or badly by many key stakeholders (including civil 
servants, and public sector professions and trade unions).  In addition, to get to 
useable information on productivity paths the data-collection and methods to be used 
 24 
must be defined authoritatively at the start of a period, and then kept substantively 
unchanged, ideally for a long time, if data comparability is to be maintained. In 
practice, this rarely happens (Hood and Dixon, 2016). When methods are changed 
or improvements made, productivity path analyses can still be analytically sustained, 
so long as both the old and new methods of computing data are overlapped  for 
several years (ideally three or more), adding to the analytic workload. 
 
-     There are some continuing barriers explaining why some governments and NSAs have 
resisted the Atkinson (2005) suggestions for creating cost-weighted total outputs 
series, despite Eurostat countries apparently signing up to it in 2010. For instance, 
using the convention that government outputs = inputs has advantages for 
governments in recessions. If governments boost public sector spending in a 
counter-cyclical way, then this part of recorded economic output immediately 
grows also, perhaps helping to boost confidence in a wider recovery. By contrast, if 
governments must wait for recorded public sector outputs to pick up, they may see 
slower, less automatic and less politically helpful effects. 
 
 
6. Conclusions and Recommendations for improving cross-
national productivity data for government  
 
Both productivity path and comparative data should ideally be action prompts that allow and 
encourage politicians, the top managers and the staffs of government organizations and public 
services networks to see how their sector or agency is developing. The point of acquiring this 
data should not be an academic, analytic or informational one alone, but rather to facilitate an 
up-to-date and contextualized understanding of performance, one that will allow corrective 
actions to be taken in real time if things are not progressing. Ideally these data should also help 
innovative thinking about growing productivity, especially from public sector staff and 
professionals themselves, who inherently have a great deal of practical knowledge of alternative 
ways of delivering services. Analysis should allow policy lessons to be derived and absorbed 
that will maximize the productivity of government in producing, funding and regulating the 
delivery of a large part of final economic outputs.  
 
The metrics to be used should also be accurate and legitimate measures that are used appropriately so 
as to maximize the trust, support, engagement and understanding of staff and stakeholders in 
the productivity-improvement process. (Staff inherently know and control detailed information 
about what is or is not working (Miller, 1993) - see for instance the impressive results of an 
‘efficiency challenge’ asking UK public sector staff for productivity ideas (Gov.UK, 2015)). 
Productivity metrics inherently deliver information only on one aspect of public agencies’ 
performance, that is the ratio of total outputs/total inputs. Using these data constructively so 
as to strengthen public services and enhance efficiency and effectiveness inherently requires 
being alert to the limited insights they can offer. And it entails policymakers and stakeholders 
making some difficult long-term commitments in a forward-looking way, rather than relying on 
attractive-looking, short-termist (and largely failed) nostrums like ‘Lean’ (Radnor and Osborne, 
2013).  
 
However, this is an opportune time for OECD members to consider advancing measures of 
government productivity because of a number of supportive trends 
- OECD and other bodies have made considerable progress in developing cross-national 
analysis of economics, education, and skills training, and some progress in healthcare. 
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These advances have increasingly left the conventional statistical treatment of 
government productivity in inputs terms as looking anomalous – it becomes harder and 
harder to defend (or even explain away) this ‘know-nothing’ tactic. Valuable information 
pooling efforts (such as OECD’s Government at a Glance data compilations) have already 
pioneered insight-drawing from cross-national public administration information 
(OECD, 2007; OECD 2015a). So there is at present a lot of goodwill to make progress. 
 
- Activity costing has improved now in a fair range of OECD countries. A 2016 OECD 
‘Survey on Measuring Productivity’ (with 17 countries responding) found that 
approximately half were using ‘activity-based costing’ in their government accounting 
systems. Slightly fewer countries said that they were measuring government productivity, 
with the most cases being for sectoral data in the education and health care systems (9 
cases each), followed by social care (7 cases) and the judicial system, defence and other 
systems (5 cases each). Applications to ministries were rarer (3 cases) and elsewhere (e.g. 
2 cases each for tax administration, procurement or municipalities). So beyond the 
national statistics level, only a smaller minority of nations have yet made progress in 
achieving consistent productivity measurement within parts of government over time - 
but many of the foundations to do so may none the less be in place. 
 
-  In the past, in a tradition starting with the Nixon administration in the early 1970s, 
many politicians and senior civil servants badly misused the concept of productivity, as if 
it was some sort of omni-performance or efficacy measurement, which of course it is 
not. This greatly increased the opposition of public sector unions and professions to 
their governments deploying metrics that they knew to give only a very limited and 
partial view of performance. There are still echoes of the old fallacy around, such as the 
UK think tank which in 2015 argued idiotically for a focus on ‘social productivity’, 
meaning only ‘everything good’ (RSA, Action and Research Centre, 2014). But now that 
public managers know that productivity is only one metric (albeit a vital and helpful 
one), and are accustomed to operating with multiple metrics, they are in a far better 
position to use productivity information responsibly and to allay stakeholders’ earlier 
fears. 
 
- We can also now generate productivity data at levels that are useable by public 
management in guiding and developing their organizations over the longer term. 
Productivity measures need no longer be just a ‘vaguely nice to know’ set of abstract 
insights about government at large. Instead they can offer immediately useful 
information to leaders and top managers in the guidance of their own organizations, 
especially in the form of productivity paths. 
 
- Rapid advances in digital information across many government functions, and 
contemporary developments such as ‘big data’ (Dunleavy, 2016; Kitchin, 2014a and 
2014b) and machine-learning (Armstrong, 2015), should contribute strongly in the next 
decade to better measures of outputs, to progressing activity costing,  and to expanding 
our capacity to generate insights into how government agencies perform and use 
resources. 
 
Recommendations 
 
OECD should establish one or a set of working parties to take forward a process of 
developing an international consensus on improving productivity measurement in government, 
with this suggested order of priorities: 
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(a) The most promising area involves working up productivity measures for the large 
central government departments and agencies discussed in section 3(a), where it is 
already feasible to complete all five essential steps outlined in section 1, and where it is 
normally not essential to try to measure services quality directly, but only to guard 
against major service lapses (as in section 2(a) above). 
 
The main agencies involved here are taxation, social security and major regulatory 
agencies all with large transactional loads. Together they account for a high proportion 
of central government staffs in all OECD countries. The precise missions of such 
agencies do not need to be completely aligned for useful comparisons to be made. Nor 
does highly detailed agreement need to be reached on statistical and definitional issues, 
because the main focus here is on first generating data on productivity paths on an annual 
data basis, and only second on comparing the paths of parallel agencies across countries.  
 
Some major national delivery agencies like prisons (see Bastow, 2013) and perhaps 
routine policing may also fall in this category – since individual cases remain a common 
denominator there also. 
 
(b) The second priority should be to make progress on central government organizations 
producing more complex outputs (where individual denomination of units is less 
feasible) discussed in section 3(b). This category includes big organizations like foreign 
ministries, defence ministries, the armed forces, and (perhaps in non-public data ways) 
intelligence and homeland security services. 
 
Both the budgetary scale and the national importance of these departments’ and 
agencies’ operations justify investing in achieving productivity paths for large sections 
(if not all) of their activities. And developing comparative insights about trends in 
different countries offers, for which productivity paths would be valuable, offers great 
potential in lesson-drawing. However, it may be that generating annual productivity 
data here would be a tall order. So more episodic exercises (for instance, conducted 
every three years or so) might be appropriate here. 
 
(c) The third priority should be to develop productivity measures for large N analyses 
at the delivery organization level in major sectors like healthcare, social care and 
education, often the policy fields where most thinking about government sector 
productivity has already taken place. There are major gains by developing single-
country databases, and even more to be made in facilitating comparisons across large N 
datasets for several or many countries. However, it is probably not feasible at this stage 
to generate annual data routinely on a comparable basis. So efforts might aim instead 
for say productivity surveys with data points spaced every three or five years. Since 
large N data permit more elaborate analysis, this would partly make up for not having 
annual productivity path information. 
 
(d)  A fourth priority might be to develop similar comparative data at the delivery 
organizational level for less salient or high cost services, but for which good data 
sources exist - sometimes because of a convergence of international technical norms 
and extensive private industry or contractor involvement. An example might be 
looking at new road investments and repairs investments against road quality achieved; 
or comparing local refuse collection productivity, where different kinds of service 
organization and capital equipment are in use. 
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(e)  Finally a fifth priority should be assigned to making further progress in national 
statistics and whole service-sector productivity numbers. Here the gains to be made are 
largely analytic and technical. However, as the options above develop, there should also 
be scope for developing national statistics to rely more on disaggregated data. 
 
Of course, national statistics agencies (NSAs), and perhaps also supreme audit 
institutions (SAIs), have key roles to play in helping the wide range of central, regional 
and local government organizations affected by recommendations (a) to (d) above to 
make progress in developing better productivity information and data at an 
organizational level. 
 28 
Notes 
 
* This paper draws primarily on joint work conducted over many years with Dr Leandro 
Carrera and crystallized in our joint book, Growing the Productivity of Government Sector 
Organizations (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2013). I am very grateful to Leandro for his patient and 
sustained research and equal development of all the ideas contained here. I would also like 
to thank Lisa von Trapp, Peter Van Deven, and Zsuzsanna Lonti of OECD, and Dean 
Parham (formerly of the Australian Productivity Commission), for exceptionally helpful 
comments and suggestions incorporated here. 
 
1    See also DCLG  Department of Communities and Local Government (2015); Lee 
(2008); OECD (2007); OECD (2009); OECD (2010);  
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